Here too, as with other aspects of the agreement, specific implementation arrangements have often been integrated, so that commitments are binding only to the extent that they are included in national plans. In order to apply this concession to a particular product, the national plan must bear the symbol “SSG” (paragraph 1). In addition to the “triggers” or conditions that merit the use of this concession, the use of this concession is subject to the following restrictions: input subsidies and other measures such as measures to reduce marketing costs. Section B has the effect of developing countries seeking to protect sensitive agricultural raw materials behind non-tariff barriers receiving greater protection than Part A would be. At the same time, it was still unlikely that developing countries would apply production restrictions on their basic food products and thus be able to make use of this exemption. Policymakers have often attempted to provide subsidized inputs as part of an attempt to offset low producer prices. These are often directed towards specific raw materials, as part of production packages including seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and machinery and credits. In such cases, the subsidy would be included in the specific portion of the product in the amS calculation, although the value of these subsidies often cannot offset the negative value of the market price support component of the AMS. If input subsidies are not directed to specific products, they would be included in the non-specific component of the AMS. It should be remembered that these include payments to producers under a pension programme in which producers abstain completely and sustainably from the production of marketable agricultural raw materials.
The modalities, however, included a provision allowing countries to gain recognition of the domestic aid reforms that took place during that period (for example). B EU CAP reforms). That is why countries had the opportunity to use 1986 as a base period. The EU, the United States and Japan have benefited from this provision, as their commitments to reduce the AMS have become less ambitious by increasing the level at which their domestic aid has begun. The following paragraphs describe some of the policies that are often implemented by developing country governments and which could be affected in the future, if not at present, by WTO commitments on domestic assistance. This chapter discusses the purpose of this chapter, which is to examine in detail the agricultural agreement and its impact on agricultural and trade policy in developing countries. The chapter will examine the differences in treatment enjoyed by developing countries under the agreement, provide a guide to the use and interpretation of the agreement, and examine the impact of full compliance with the agreement on existing agricultural policies in the context of developing countries. After the introduction, this chapter is divided according to the main parts of the agreement, i.e. market access, domestic support commitments and export subsidies. Each of these sections serves as a guide to relevant articles and annexes of the agreement, examines the interpretation of the various paragraphs and clauses, and focuses on areas where the commitments of developing countries differ from those of developed countries.